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This paper is a preliminary discussion of the connections between environmental and 
human security through the notion of environmental refugees.  The concept of 
environmental refugees appeared in a 1985 paper that argued while the term may be 
legitimate, such a category of refugees would constitute a minor part of the world’s 
refugee population, if at all.  Later discussions by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and Norman Meyer contradict this position with estimates of up 
to 200 million environmental refugees by 2050.  These latter predictions are currently 
endorsed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the areas of refugees 
and global environmental issues.  Of particular interest has been Friends of the Earth’s 
Climate Justice campaign, and Rising Tide International’s Climate Justice Network. 
 
These NGOs and others argue that this humanitarian impact of global climate change 
presents significant issues for the Asia Pacific region. Environmental refugees are 
estimated to flow in the millions in Australia’s neighbourhood as a result of global 
warming. However, environmental refugees do not appear in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which conceives of refugees mainly in terms of political and social rights, 
particularly as expressed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Thus, while 
NGOs present a convincing case for the legitimacy of the rights of environmental 
refugees, international law does not recognise their plight.  This paper argues that the 
NGO focus on environmental justice within these campaigns opens up critical space for 
the concept of environmental refugees and new discussions around a human right to 




While the popular activist refrain is “think globally, act locally”, the effects of global 
environmental problems have started to become very local for those feeling the first impacts 
of climate changes associated with global warming.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (1990) highlighted that the most significant impacts of climate change will be felt on 
coastlines through erosion, sea level rise, saline intrusion into freshwater sources, and 
through loss of agricultural productivity in these areas.  The accuracy of these projections has 
begun to be felt throughout the Asia-Pacific region, with these impacts and the displacement 
of those affected by coastal erosion, salt water intrusion, storm surges, and the decline of 
agricultural productivity (IPCC 1998).  
 
Environmental degradation was identified among the four underlying sources of refugee 
flows by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ State of the World’s Refugees 
report (UNHCR 1993).  Environmentally driven relocation has been identified as an 
increasing proportion of the world’s displaced peoples. The Red Cross/Red Crescent World 
Disasters Report of 2001 argues that up to 58% of the world’s refugee population is what has 
become increasingly referred to as “environmental refugees” (Red Cross/Red Crescent 2001). 
Approximately 25 million people are estimated to fall into this category, with the IPCC 
predicting an increase to 150 million by 2050 (2001), largely through the projected to flow of 
peoples due to climate change impacts. 
 
In recent years, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the environmental issue 
arena have mobilised the term “environmental refugees” to highlight the impacts stemming 
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from climate change.  In Australia, NGOs have focused on the particular vulnerabilities of the 
small island states of the Pacific region.  Their arguments have centred around the 
responsibility that Australia and the rest of the developed world bears for the situation facing 
these nations through the lack of action on climate change, and the likely future ramifications.  
Campaigns have been strongly characterised by environmental justice as a discourse, and 
NGOs have specifically referred to their position and approach as one of climate justice (for 




Refugees are defined by the international community using a narrow legal definition derived 
from the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951).  The use of the term 
environmental refugees by environmental NGOs and others quite obviously has ramifications 
for current understandings of what constitutes a refugee. This has motivated spirited 
discussion within refugee studies about if and how environmental refugees might be defined, 
and whether the term has legitimacy. 
 
The first use or definition of the term “refugee” appeared in a 1798 publication of the 
Encyclopedia Brittanica (Marrus 1985). The current convention provides the contemporary 
definition of refugees as persons who,  
 
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his [her] origin, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself [herself] of the protection of that country; or … owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Article 1(A) (2) para. 2; United Nations 
1983: 11). 
 
The convention remains a document that can be situated in a particular time period and place, 
designed to cover a narrow range of phenomena.  The convention was developed to assist 
with re-location, re-settlement and assistance during Europe’s refugee crisis following World 
War II.  The earlier roots of the convention are located in the desire to secure protection via 
international law for those displaced by war.  Before 1848, refugees were not considered an 
important issue in international affairs, and received little discussion or consideration at this 
level (Marrus 1985), thus no clear regime was in place. It was not until the 1917 Russian 
Revolution that moves began to establish a way to assist and/or protect large movements of 
people.  In response, the League of Nations created a High Commissioner for Refugees in 
1921 as a temporary response to the “Russian problem”. In 1933, the Convention Relating to 
the International Status of Refugees came into force to offer legal protection for these groups, 
though, it provided no obligation for states to accept refugees – refugee status was group 
defined, and simply considered to be those who lacked protection and nationality (Barnett 
2002).  The International Refugee Organization (IRO) was created as another temporary 
organisation in 1948 to facilitate post-World War II resettlements, is the clearest precursor to 
the current regime.  The IRO conceived for the first time an individual definition of refugees, 
to be assessed case-by-case. This approach carries through to the current regime, and much 
remains unchanged.  Creation of the UNHCR in 1950 was the first recognition of refugees as 
a permanent rather than a temporary issue in international affairs.  Today, the convention 




The definition of refugees, and the obligations under the convention were recently reaffirmed 
during the 50th anniversary celebration of the refugee regime.  Through the UNHCR 2004 
process, member states agreed to hold the Convention, it’s definitions, and the obligations it 
sets forth for states at the status quo.  Scholars of refugee studies and the UNHCR have 
highlighted the difficulty of attaining even this level of commitment from the international 
community (personal communication, Robyn Lui, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and 
Governance, Griffith University; United Nations 2002), especially in light of the increased 
securitisation of refugee and asylum issues by many developed nations (for example see: 
Burke 2001 on Australia).  This is clearly demonstrated in Australia by the introduction of the 
“Pacific Solution”, and the excise of outlying islands from Australia’s migration zone (Maley 
2003).   
 
Many in international debates around refugee issues argue that the term “refugee” should be 
reserved for a narrowly defined class of displaced persons, as defined within the convention.  
Particularly, they argue that the limited legal definition of refugees outlined above should be 
the measure applied to cases of displaced persons (Black 2001).  While such an approach 
serves to make clear the legal obligations of states under international law, and also to delimit 
the responsibilities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
relation to it’s international protection role (versus its international aid role), it neglects an 
important point.  Academic discussion and dialogue over important issues (humanitarian or 
otherwise) should not seek to bind itself to legal definitions, or the constructions of existing 
international law.  Indeed, Malkii contends that the term refugee only has usefulness as a 
“broad legal or descriptive rubric” (1995: 496), and thus dialogue around issues of 
movements of people should not shape or constrain itself around the definition.   
 
Several significant periods of debate about the connection between environmental 
degradation and refugees have occurred since the convention was negotiated in 1951.  The 
two most significant discussions for the purposes of this paper were parallel to large-scale 
institutional concern about climate change, circa 1988-1995, and more recently in the early 
half of the first decade of the 21st century.  In her early seminal work, Jacobson argued that 
“environmental refugees have become the single largest class of displaced persons in the 
world” (1988: 6).  However, there has been vigorous criticism of the application of the term 
refugee to environmentally induced displacements in some circles (for example see: 
McGregor 1993; Kibreab 1997). It is clear that environmental refugees lie outside the 
international legal definition of refugees, and outside the regime in place at the international 
level for resolving refugee issues (Hathaway 1991; Rizvi 1988). The UNHCR has denied a 
basis for environmental refugees, instead highlighting the importance of its existing mandate, 
and has argued that individuals impacted by environmental degradation will be able to avail 
themselves of the protection offered by their own governments, and through internal 
resettlement (NEF 2003).  Obviously, the case of climate change refugees, discussed at length 
below, challenges this argument given the projections of small island states in the Pacific 
ceasing to exist. Given the attention paid to the issue by international organisations and 
policymakers (for example Jacobsen (1988) works for the Worldwatch Institute and El-
Hinnawi (1985) worked for United Nations Environment Program at the time), especially 
with the documentation of prominent cases, it has proved difficult to dismiss outright.  
Significantly, scholars of international law have argued that the principles of refugee status, 
and on what grounds protection is relevant, must now be understood separately from the 
articles of the convention, and could include “man-made [sic] disaster” (Goodwin-Gill 1991: 
28), such as environmental degradation.  Indeed, as many rightly point out, “[i]n a world 
where the rigid constructions of the traditional international system are beginning to crumble, 
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established approaches to refugee policy are becoming irrelevant as well” (Barnett 2002: 
239).  This obviously opens the way for consideration of the legitimacy of claims of 
environmental refugees. 
 
But how are environmental refugees defined?  Two pivotal factors to consider in defining 
environmental refugees have been the type of displacement, and choice of movement.  In this 
way, the debate has been clearly shaped by the requirements of the refugee convention.  
Norman Myers defines environmental refugees as: “people who could no longer gain a secure 
livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation 
and other environmental problems, together with the associated problems of population 
pressures and profound poverty” (Myers 2002: 609).  Interestingly, Myers counts those 
people who are displaced internally by environmental degradation, as well as those displaced 
externally, in his work.  Certainly, in international law, only those displaced externally 
(across an international border) are considered a refugee, others are simply displaced persons.  
More generally accepted is the definition of Jacobsen who states her position as: “those 
individuals who have been forced to leave their country of origin due to the deterioration of 
their surrounding environment which no longer provides basic elements needed to sustain 
life” (1988: 6).  Consequently, numbers of environmental refugees are largely undocumented 
(Myers 2002), but the reasons behind migration flows are complex and can often include 
social, political and environmental reasons.  Indeed, those “guesstimations” and calculations 
of environmental refugees that do exist are rarely comparable due to the incompatible 
definitions and measurements that are used among different writers in the area. 
 
The other key factor relates to choice:  in line with the convention, the literature nominates a 
lack of choice, signalled by the existence of “coercion or force” as a key characteristic of 
individuals labelled environmental “refugees” (El-Hinnawi 1985).  The main reason for this 
distinction in the literature relates to existing issues within refugee politics around individuals 
who leave their country of origin without coercion or force:  these individuals have come to 
be referred to as “economic refugees”.  Economic refugees are those driven to seek other 
circumstances because of the lack of food, work, stable economic conditions, and prolonged 
poverty.  Myers acknowledges in his work that it is “difficult to differentiate between 
refugees that are driven by environmental factors and those that are impelled by economic 
problems” (Myers 2002: 610).  Thus, “the refugee is commonly distinguished from the 
economic migrant as someone who is forced to migrate, rather than somebody who has 
moved more or less voluntarily” (Black 2001: 63; emphasis added).  Suhrke points out that 
this is where much criticism comes from scholars of international law towards the concept of 
environmental refugees.  Understandings of force within international law are directly related 
to physical force, or the imminent threat of physical force or coercion via direct individual 
political or social persecution.  Those who argue a case for environmental refugees conceive 
of this force or coercion more sociologically than legally (Suhrke 1994), and apply this 
measure to geographically located groups, rather than individuals.   
 
Part of the challenge is that it is often difficult to disentangle the reasons behind refugee 
movements – they are complex rather than clear cut – environmental might often be 
combined with economic, or environmental reasons lead to political strife, or vice versa.  
However, despite the lack of legal recognition of the plight of environmental refugees, there 
is significant recognition within the international community, amongst security theorists, and 
by other groups of the role of environmental causes in the displacement of people from their 
homes. But, there remains significant debate over what to call these individuals, questions 
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about the appropriateness of calls for international protection and/or asylum, and how to 
define the group of people who should be eligible for the term environmental refugees. 
 
Climate Justice Campaigns and Environmental Refugees 
 
One prominent example of the use of the term environmental refugees has been through 
various climate justice campaigns involving environmental NGOs in developed countries. 
Friends of the Earth’s (FoE) Climate Justice Campaign focuses on the issue of climate change 
in two significant ways: it highlights the disproportionate burden placed on the small island 
states by projected and actual changes in weather, particularly rising sea level (Davissen & 
Long 2003) and it emphasises the unequal share of atmospheric resources that Australia and 
other developed countries are utilising (polluting) through their energy-intensive lifestyles. 
 
The discourse of environmental justice, earlier brought to bear on urban industrial 
environmental problems, including the siting of toxic waste dumps, polluting chemical 
industries and waste processing facilities in largely black and Hispanic lower socio-economic 
neighbourhoods in the United States (Bullard 1983, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995) has been 
broadened to encompass a wider range of socio-political concerns in environmental debates.  
Campaigns, mainly in the United States on toxics, pointed out the correlations between race 
and class, and environmental risk in the workplace and the community.  As these connections 
became drawn, attention was also concentrated to the often unequal contributions of different 
sectors of society to the production and consumption that introduces environmental risks. The 
over-consumption by the privileged of those items that create these risks, and their ability to 
purchase “protection” from these risks through better housing, better medical care, and better 
nutrition is a recurrent theme.  With the advent of global environmental issues and their entry 
onto the international political agenda, the parallel to the contributions versus burdens of 
lesser developed countries in these issues was highlighted (Esteva 1992; Hofrichter 1993; 
Khor 1993).  The discourse of environmental justice has highlighted the disproportionate 
production of toxic and hazardous wastes by developed countries, and their export of these 
risks to lesser developed countries lacking the capacity to treat or store them safely.  
Campaigners point out that the destination for old growth timbers from tropical rainforests in 
the lesser developed world was for furniture and flooring in upmarket developed world 
homes.  The shift of industrial processing and manufacturing from the developed world 
meant a cleaner environment in developed nations, as well as uninterrupted affordable 
consumption, but the cost for lesser developed countries was increased industrial pollution 
and unsafe workplaces.  Shiva (2002) has referred to this process whereby the lesser 
developed world loses control of its natural resources, and bears the majority of 
environmental risks as “environmental apartheid”, while other critical academics have 
referred to “environmental colonialism” (Agarwal & Narain 1991; Redclift, 1992; Jasanoff, 
1993; Nelson 2003). Thus, environmental justice has become a globally oriented discourse 
highlighting the “winners” and “losers” in relation to the burdens and costs arising unequally 
from environmental issues.   
 
Climate justice campaigns in particular highlight the unequal contributions to, and burdens 
arising from, the projected impacts of global warming.  The impacts of climate change are 
likely to be semi-democratic, conforming to Beck’s contention that in the risk society, 
everyone is affected (1992: 46).  While the vulnerabilities to climate change are not uniform, 
all countries will be affected in a number of ways.  However, the ability to prepare for, insure 
against or adapt to these impacts rests squarely with the developed nations.  The adoption of 
an adaptation rather than a mitigation strategy clearly favours those with the resources to 
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protect against these vulnerabilities.  Indeed, only four of the world’s megacities located on 
coastlines are not in the developing world (NEF 2003).  The potential dangers to such low-
lying areas have been well outlined in scientific assessments of climate change. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Third Assessment Report, produced a 
range of projected impacts of climate change.  Most significant here in their finding that 
significant vulnerability existed for human populations settled on coastal and/or low lying 
areas, particularly small islands with little elevation above sea level.  These communities are 
at likely to experience sea-level rise and increased storm surges that present a set of social 
and economic effects likely to be significant in their impacts (IPCC 2001).  The small island 
Pacific nations, under current IPCC projections, are likely to be impacted by lack of food 
security due to increased soil salinity from rising water tables, salination impacts on 
freshwater resources, health impacts related to the increased prevalence of tropical and 
vector-borne diseases, impacts on coastal ecosystems, as well as infrastructure degradation 
due to more frequent tropical storms and storm surges.  The economic impact of these 
combined factors, are obviously catastrophic.  (IPCC 1998). This is especially so when it is 
realised that the irreversible damage done to an island occurs long before actual 
submergence, especially once salt water has intruded into the fresh water supply and the food 
chain (Simpson 2003).  The loss of land mass and the erosion of shorelines will be 
subsequent to these impacts, though undoubtedly most significant of all.   
 
Within the debate on environmental refugees, FoE and others1 have concentrated on this 
particular facet – displacement of peoples induced by the impacts of climate change. The 
focus on the small island states of the Pacific is significant due not just to their high 
vulnerability under all projected scenarios (IPCC 1998), but most significantly because of 
their almost insignificant contribution to the greenhouse gas emissions producing climate 
change.  The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which includes the Pacific Islands 
among its 35 member states, with a 0.06% share of the world’s current emissions, is 
collectively one of the least prodigious producers of climate changing gases (IPCC 2001).  
This situation clearly highlights global climate change as an environmental justice issue for 
these states:  the contributions made to the creation of the problem are insignificant, yet these 
islands reap the burdens and risks associated with climate change.  The use of equity and 
justice discourses within discussions in the climate change debate highlight a number of 
important issues.  Firstly, it focuses attention on the unequal use of global commons 
resources.  NGOs have highlighted the equity issue involved thusly: 
 
“FoE believes in equitable and sustainable use of resources across a fair share of 
what we call “environmental space” … [which] … can be defined as the amount 
of these resources that each person can use without causing irreversible damage 
to the Earth” (Davissen and Long 2003: 7)  
 
Secondly, it raises the question of reparation. The New Economic Foundation (NEF) takes a 
clearly global environmental justice viewpoint with their notion of ecological debt. They 
posit that when “citizens of one country take more than their fair share of a global 
environmental “common” such as the atmosphere” (2003: 33) they should compensate those 
countries negatively affected by their over-consumption.  This is a significant issue for the 
AOSIS given their limited resources for adaptation strategies, and the vulnerabilities already 
being experienced.  The avenues for protest or redress available to countries bearing the 
burden of climate change are few.  In 2002, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu announced he was 
considering legal action against Australia and the United States as two of the worst 
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contributors to global warming, and thus, his country’s destruction (NEF 2003).  Such legal 
redress is likely to be difficult given the legal requirements to prove not only causation, but 
also intention.  However, the NEF argues that: 
 
“[h]arm is intentional when a set of policies is pursued in full knowledge of its 
damaging consequences.  The causes and consequences of climate change – who 
is responsible, who gets hurt – are sufficiently understood.  To disregard that 
knowledge, or to fail to respond adequately, must be classed as intentional 
behaviour” (2003: 30).   
 
Thus, countries with poor records of emission reduction should be subject to litigation, due to 
their knowledge of the scientific basis of climate change, and their intentional policies of 
non-remediation.  In the NEF’s view, this would clearly include Australia and the United 
States for their refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or institute effective unilateral mitigation 
policies. 
 
Of more interest here, their actions can be argued to represent direct persecution of the 
relevant peoples (i.e. Tuvaluans in this case) under the refugee convention definition when 
the notion of intentional harm despite full knowledge is considered.  This line of argument is 
being embraced by NGOs in their discussions of environmental refugees (NEF 2003; 
Davissen & Long 2003).  A clear trajectory is drawn from the premises of environmental 
justice’s emphasis on equal sharing of global resources and burdens through to the 
compensation of those negatively affected.  The implications here are clear in terms of 
environmental justice:  the responsibility for climate change rests proportionally with those 
who emit the most.  The small island states of the Pacific are in line to reap the overwhelming 
burden of the developed nations’ fossil fuel dependency and profligacy beginning from the 
industrial revolution. In light of the scientific community’s consensus around global warming 
(IPCC 2001), the failure to institute mitigation strategies and policies becomes not ignorant, 
but intentional damage to be redressed by the international community.   
 
An environmental justice approach to the impacts of climate change in these campaigns also 
opens up room for the discussion of human rights issues in relation to climate change 
impacts. The Inuit also announced in 2002 their intention to seek redress through 
international law for the destruction of their cultural heritage, and the impingement on their 
cultural rights of the United States’ refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol or curb their emissions.  
The Inuit claim stems from the encroachment of sea level rise, the shortening of the winter 
hunting season, and potential destruction of cultural heritage (Brown 2003).  But cultural 
rights are not the most significant ones at stake in this debate.  Elementary human rights are 
implicated through the issue of environmental refugees: “the fundamental principle of justice  
[states] that every individual is entitled to the protection of a state in a territory where they 
can earn the necessities of life” (Nash 1999: 229).  At least five small island states may cease 
to exist – and this presents a new challenge for the international regime on refugees and 
international human rights law.  Friends of the Earth and others point to the current situation 
facing residents of Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Maldives, Niue and the Cateret Islands to illustrate 
the forthcoming plight of many Pacific islanders, as well residents of the wider Asian region, 
over the coming decades.  The future is far from certain for those threatened by climate 
change, and those areas most at threat are those who can least afford to follow the status quo 
and institute “adaptation” strategies later.  Several of the Pacific islands have already 






The focus on environmental justice perspectives within NGO campaigns around climate 
change presents a number of interesting emergent issues for the international and academic 
communities.  Climate change is producing disproportionate burdens for those countries least 
equipped to adapt or mitigate them.  Environmental justice assumes an equal sharing of 
common goods and bads, and that those negatively impacted should be compensated. 
 
Climate justice campaigns offer a number of areas worthy of further investigation for 
scholars of international politics, particularly the invocation of human rights within debates 
around environmental refugees and other significantly affected communities.  The 
assumptions that NGOs and affected communities make regarding human rights and the 
environment is an area in need of further investigation, as well as how these understandings 
correlate with international human rights law.  The possibility presented by these issues is the 
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 For brevity, only Friends of the Earth’s campaign is discussed in this paper, but other significant 
campaigns with a similar focus are being run by: Rising Tide International (United Kingdom and The 
Netherlands), Climate Chaos (The Czech Republic), Climate Justice Programme (US climate 
litigation campaign), Australia’s Climate Justice Programme (by the Climate Action Network 
Australia, and law firm Maurice Blackburn Cashman) and Amsterdam Radical Klimate Action (The 
Netherlands). 
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 Kiribati has begun moving vulnerable populations to outlying islands with higher ground, Niue 
accepted the migration of seven families from Tuvalu, the Cateret Islands of Papua New Guinea have 
experienced significant salination related crop failure and will need to be relocated.  Tuvalu also came 
to a widely publicised resettlement agreement with New Zealand which will see at least half of its 
population moved within the next decade. 
